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ABSTRACT 
Schramm, G., 1981. Input  and output  constraints affecting irrigation development. In: 
L.R. Beard (Guest-Editor), Water for Survival. J. Hydroh, 51: 1--16. 
In many of the developing countries the expansion of irrigated agriculture is used as a 
major development tool for bringing about increases in agricultural output,  rural eco- 
nomic growth and income distribution. Apart from constraints imposed by water avail- 
ability, the major limitations considered to any acceleration of such programs are usually 
thought to be those of costs and financial resources. However, as is shown on the basis of 
empirical data drawn from Mexico, in reality the feasibility and effectiveness of such 
development programs is even more constrained by the lack of specialized physical and 
human factors on the input and market limitations on the output  side. On the input 
side, the limited availability of complementary factors such as, for example, truly func- 
tioning credit systems for small-scale farmers or effective agricultural extension services 
impose long-term constraints on development. On the output  side the limited availability, 
high risk, and relatively slow growth of markets for high-value crops sharply reduce the 
usually hoped-for and projected profitable crop mix that would warrant the frequently 
high costs of irrigation investments. Three conclusions are drawn: 
(1) Factors in limited supply have to be shadow-priced to reflect their high oppor- 
tuni ty  costs in alternative uses. 
(2) Re-allocation of financial resources from immediate construction of projects to 
longer-term increase in the supply of scarce, highly-trained manpower resources are nec- 
essary in order to optimize development over time. 
(3) Inclusion of high-value, high-income producing crops in the benefit--cost analysis 
of new projects is inappropriate if these crops could potentially be grown in already 
existing projects. 
INTRODUCTION 
In most  developing countries agricultural planning, and, within it, irrigation 
planning, proceeds initially at the macro-level, with targets established on the 
basis of expected population growth, food import  requirements or export 
targets, availability of funds, etc. In the case of Mexico, for example, the 
National Water Plan has analysed likely demands on a macro-basis until the 
year 2000, and concluded that within that period an approximate doubling 
of agricultural land subject to water control (irrigation, flood control and 
drainage) would be needed (S.R.H., 1975, Ch. V). 
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Within these general projections, more detailed ones, such as projections 
of  individual commodi ty  needs and a listing of potential project sites may 
also be included .1 . However,  beyond these statements and assessments, de- 
tailed program and project analysis normally proceeds strictly on a micro- 
level, i.e. a project-by-project  basis. This is understandable, given the quantum 
jump in qualitative and quantitative information that has to be assembled on 
a location-specific basis before the feasibility of a specific project can be eval- 
uated. This process takes much time, requires detailed agricultural, engineer- 
ing and economic analyses, and is subject to many variables that  affect  the 
overall t ime needed to come to a final decision. As a result, the planning and 
decision process for a project  frequently requires many years and, on oc- 
casion, a decade or more will pass from first conception to project start-up or 
final rejection. For all but  the smallest and simplest projects two years of 
planning and preparatory work appears to be the absolute minimum. 
The disadvantage of these long lead times is that  many of the underlying 
assumptions, projections and parameters may change, while the evaluation of  
a given project  proceeds. These changes, unfortunately,  are rarely taken into 
account,  if only because the terms of reference for a given study are fixed 
from the outset. Furthermore,  because of the necessity to proceed with de- 
tailed planning on a case-by-case basis, and because of  the uncertainty when 
a given project may finally be approved and financed, the effects of  them on 
factor or product  markets is rarely taken into account. Or if they are taken 
into account,  then the evaluation is limited to an analysis of the individual 
project 's  effect  on these markets, wi thout  reference to the combined effects 
of  all other projects or programs that are realized at the same time elsewhere 
in the economy.  As a consequence, it is often found that assumed avail- 
abilities of  input factors which are in overall short supply do not  materialize, 
or do so only at highly inflated costs .2 , or in quantitities or qualities that  
are insufficient for the task at hand (see also Schramm, 1976). On the 
output  side, the effects are frequently that particularly valuable components  
of projected production do not  materialize, because the available markets 
for these high-value crops have been occupied by others. But even if this is 
not  the case, it can be shown that in many cases the successful development  
of  high-value crops production within a new project does nothing more than 
to frustrate the expansion of  such production elsewhere. This means that  
this ou tpu t  increment is not  a genuine, project-specific addition to national 
income but  an increment achieved through substi tution from an existing or 
potential producer  in one region to a new one in another. While these shifts 
in the location of  product ion may be desirable from an income distributional 
point  of  view, in t e rms  of national efficiency objectives the net value of  the 
ou tpu t  achieved is not  and should not  be counted as a project benefit.  The 
following data, d rawn from Mexico, will illuminate these points. 
• 1 Mexico's National Water Plan contains both types of  projections. 
• 2 F o r  a rigorous definition and analysis o f  the opportunity costs of  displaced production 
see S c h r a m m  ( 1 9 7 2 ) .  
I R R I G A T I O N  AND  R U R A L  D E V E L O P M E N T  IN M E X I C O  
While irrigation has been practiced in Mexico for many centuries, system- 
atic, government supported and financed development  began in 1926, 
when the first Federal irrigation law was promulgated. Today,  ~ 5 - 1 0 6  ha 
out  of 16.8" 106 ha of agricultural land are irrigated, and the value of  agricul- 
tural ou tpu t  from irrigated land amounts  to somewhat  over 50% of  the total 
(Escamilla et al., 1975). Strong efforts were made by the Mexican govern- 
ment  during the 1970's to increase agricultural ou tpu t  in general, both as a 
means of alleviating rural poverty and unemployment  and for the purpose of  
increasing agricultural output .  Investments in new and rehabilitated irrigation 
projects played an important  part  in this strategy. While total Federal invest- 
ment  in irrigation projects between 1926 and 1970, a 45-yr. period, resulted 
in the development  of  " 2 , 9 5 9 , 0 0 0 h a ,  between 1971 and 1974, or within 
four years, "~ 337,000 ha were added. In addition, some 234,000 ha of  existing 
irrigated land were rehabilitated during the same four-year period (S.R.H., 
1975, Vol. II). 
Irrigation development  proceeds within the f ramework of  two distinct 
programs, both administered by the Ministry of  Water Resources (Secretaria 
de Recursos Hidraulicos, or S.R.H.) .1 The first is responsible for the 
development  or rehabilitation of  large-scale irrigation districts which may 
range in size from a few hundred to several hundred thousand hectares, while 
the second concentrates on the development  of  small-size units that  may 
range from a few hectares to a maximum legal size of  2,500 ha, with an aver- 
age size of  less than 200 ha. With an average annual addition or rehabilitation 
of  150 ,000- -200 ,000ha  .2 and a planning-construction period of  several 
years for many of the larger projects, it means that several hundred of them 
are in various stages of  planning, evaluation, design or construct ion at any 
given time. It is obvious that  coordination between the individual depart- 
ments and groups responsible for these individual projects is a difficult task, 
the more so because the planning, construction and operating phases of  any 
one project  are the responsibility of  distinct departments  within the S.R.H. 
An important  characteristic of  these developments is that  they are de- 
signed to aid exclusively small-scale landholders. According to the 1972 
Water Law, individual landholdings in new Federally-financed irrigation proj- 
ects are limited to 20 ha. This imposes heavy requirements on outside tech- 
nical education and extension services, since the majori ty of  these farmers 
have only limited skills, experience and formal education *a . 
• 1 Since the  end  o f  1976 ,  the act ivit ies  of  S.R.H. have been  merged  w i th  t h a t  of  the  
f o r m e r  Min is t ry  o f  Agr icu l tu re  in to  the  Min is t ry  o f  Agr icu l tu re  and  Hydrau l i c  Resources  
(S.A.R.H.) .  
• 2 This  inc ludes  double -cropping .  
• 3 In 1970 ,  43 .6% of  the agricultural  p o p u l a t i o n  had no formal  educat ion ,  whi le  another  
39.1 had  o n l y  b e t w e e n  I and  3 yr.  o f  schoo l ing .  A c c o r d i n g  to M e x i c a n  authori t ies  on the 
subjec t ,  all o f  t h e m  are classif ied as func t iona l  i l l i terates (Urquid i ,  1974) .  
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In addition to irrigation developments,  the Mexican government makes 
other strenuous efforts to improve both ou tpu t  and income in the sector. 
Particularly no tewor thy  are large-scale credit programs for the livestock and 
agro-industrial sectors, as well as major, comprehensive rural development  
programs that are directed towards the integrated development  of some one- 
hundred specially selected micro-regions throughout  the country with an 
average of  10,000 farm families in each *~ . 
INPUT C O N S T R A I N T S  
Overall, governmental budget allocations to the agricultural sector in real 
terms increased more than seven-fold between 1970 and 1975 from 7.6% of 
total expenditures to 20.1% (Escamilla et al., 1975). However, financial 
resources alone are not  enough to achieve the simultaneous goals of  increased 
ou tpu t  and improved income distribution. The latter, in the long run, 
depends largely on the former .2 . But  in order to bring about  increased pro- 
duction other  inputs are needed besides physical infrastructure such as 
irrigation water, improved road access or agricultural warehouses. A whole 
series of  supporting services must be provided in order to achieve the expected 
product ion potential. Such supporting services include availability and time- 
liness of  short- and long-term credit; and of fertilizers, seeds and insecticides; 
accessibility to markets and marketing facilities; and the availability of effec- 
tive agricultural research and extension services. All of  these ancillary services 
depend on the availability and functioning of relatively complex human- 
operated delivery systems. 
The importance of these supporting services has been recognized. As a 
result most,  if not  all of the larger agricultural development  projects in 
Mexico, as in many other  countries, now make specific provisions for the 
supply of  them. Typical of  these comprehensive project packages is the 
Papaloapan Rural Development  Project, which includes provisions and bud- 
gets for irrigation facilities, extension services, experimental farms, feeder 
roads, marketing facilities, incremental working capital, technical services, 
water sewerage, electricity, medical centers, schools and workshops, and 
communi ty  centers (see LaMadrid, 1975). 
It is conceivable that  all of these services will be delivered and will work 
and function as predicted, particularly if these new projects are financially 
well endowed so that  they can outbid  other competi tors  for the scarce 
professional input factors required. However,  the problem in a macro-sense 
is precisely that  these input factors are scarce and that they have many 
*l F o r  the  de ta i led  desc r ip t ion  o f  ye t  a n o t h e r  t y p e  o f  rura l  d e v e l o p m e n t  p rog ram s e e  
LaMadr id  (1975) .  
*2 In t he  sho r t - run ,  of  course ,  g o v e r n m e n t a l  e x p e n d i t u r e s  in the  f o r m  of  wages to  un-  or  
u n d e r e m p l o y e d  agr icu l tura l  worke r s  can have an  i m p o r t a n t  impac t  o n  rura l  incomes .  
alternative employment  opportunities.  What this means is that  the new proj- 
ects, which have yet  to be built, receive the scarce services that  could not  be 
supplied to projects or operations that are already in existence, and that 
would not  require the expensive infrastructure investment of the new projects. 
Hence, ceteris paribus, the marginal productivi ty of  such a scarce input 
factor is much higher in an already existing project than in a new one. From 
an efficiency point  of view (albeit not  necessarily an equity point  of  view), 
therefore, its use in new projects is inferior to its use in projects which require 
less additional investment and other resources to match its own productive 
contribution.  
As Schramm (1976) has estimated, even a sustained 10% per year increase 
in the ou tpu t  of trained agronomists and agricultural engineers in Mexico 
would not  cover the estimated shortages of these professionals until shortly 
before the turn of  the century.  In 1974 there were some 2,851 extensionists 
active in the field (Bassoco de Gdmez Tagle, 1975). The estimated require- 
ments, however,  were some 18,800 and growing because of the growing 
agricultural base. These shortages can be ameliorated to some extent.  Under 
a new extension service system for small-scale dryland farmers, for example, 
the service of one trained agronomist is supplemented by up to five low- 
level, trained helpers. Whether this method will actually be successful re- 
mains to be seen however.  
The inability to obtain the services of  such skilled manpower  is one of  
the major constraints facing more rapid agricultural development  almost any- 
where. This problem is world-wide, as many studies have shown (see e.g., 
Williams and Miller, 1973; Coombs and Manzor, 1974; Kirpich, 1976). 
The importance of  these human-skill based supporting services can be 
readily shown from the significant physical yield differentials between 
producers that  are using available best practice as compared to those that 
achieve only average yields. Using a standard crop composi t ion that  reflects 
actual Mexican conditions (but  excludes high-value crops such as fruits and 
vegetables for reasons discussed below) the data compiled in Table I show 
that net income per hectare of  irrigated land, before accounting for irrigation 
investment costs, would amount  to between approximately US $111 to $ 282 
depending on the type  of project, if average observed physical yields per hec- 
tare are obtained (at full labor costs). However, if projected yields would be 
achieved instead, income would rise to between $152 and $329 per hectare. 
Applying 1976 average irrigation investment costs per hectare, the internal 
rates of return are a low 4--5% at full labor costs, and 7% with a labor shad- 
ow wage rate of  0.7 if only average yields are achieved. With projected best 
practice yields, on the other  hand, the internal rates of  return increase to 
more respectable 10--11% and 12--13% ranges, respectively. Since projected 
yields are those that  could be safely achieved with superior agricultural 
practice, it follows that  management capabilities, rather than physical charac- 
teristics largely determine the economic viability of  irrigation investments. 
TABLE I 
Differences in average and potential agricultural yields and their effects on project rates 
of  return (1976 costs and prices US $1.00 -- Mex. pesos 12.50) 
(A) Basic data .1 
Crop Actual average Projected average Crop composition Value of output  
yield per ha yield per ha (%) . per ton 
(tons) (tons) (US $) 
Maize 2.15 3.00 58.7 152.00 
Beans 1.12 1.50 14.1 440.00 
Sorghum 3.43 4.50 12.4 132.00 
Wheat 2.67 4.00 8.5 144.00 
Alfalfa 44.30 50.00 6.3 19.76 
Average 
per ha - -  - -  100.0 - -  
(B) I n c o m e  and rates o f  re turn  
Type of project With full labor costs With 0.7 shadow 
wage rate 
actual projected actual projected 
yields yields yields yields 
Tube-well net income per 
pump ha (US $) 111 282 152 329 
investment costs 
per ha (US $) 1,888 
internal rate of 
return (%) 4 11 7 13 
Surface net income per 
reservoir ha (US $) 194 366 237 412 
investment costs 
(US $) 2,832 
internal rate of  
return (%) 5 10 7 12 
,1 Based on Schramm (1977, tables 9 and 13). 
*2 Actual average yields are those obtained in all small-scale irrigation projects in Mexico 
in 1974--1975. 
*3 Projected average yields represent the mid-range of those predicted for irrigation proj- 
ects under construction in 1975--1976. 
,4 Production costs for projects producing "projec ted"  rather than average yields were 
increased by 10% to reflect higher input costs. 
*s Net income per hectare accounts for all input costs including water charges that cover 
operating and maintenance costs, except capital and interest costs for the irrigation invest- 
ment. 
TABLE I (continued) 
.6 Internal rates of return (IRR) are calculated assuming 20% less than average yields in 
the first year, with full maturity reached in year 6. If full-maturity yields could be ob- 
tained in the first year, the deep-well IRR under projected yields would increase to 17 
and 21% and the surface reservoir to 15 and 17%, respectively. 
What can be concluded from the data in Table I is that  the net benefits 
from a successful extension and management service can be measured by the 
net difference in the internal rates of return between projects that  produce 
only average, and others that  actually achieve projected yields. In the above 
example, this difference amounts to 5 out  of the 12% rate of return for a 
surface reservoir and 6 out of the 13% rate of return for tube-well pump 
projects. 
Because of this crucial importance of the human skill, management-related 
input factors, and because of the very substantial lead-times required to 
properly train and produce such individuals, one of the most important  strat- 
egies of long-term agricultural development is to devote more resources to 
training aspects, and somewhat less to the more immediate physical infra- 
structure type investments. While the latter will be much more visible, the 
former represent the real structural, long-term bottleneck that  holds back 
agricultural output  to levels substantially below existing potential. 
OUTPUT CONSTRAINTS 
Output  constraints are basically market  related. They occur, because 
hoped-for, predicted markets for certain crops do not  materialize, or are 
available only at prices far below those predicted in the project planning 
stage. 
These errors in forecasting are usually the result of a lack of  integration of 
national, or market-wide projections of demand on the one hand, and an 
analysis of the totali ty of existing and potential supply from all sources on 
the other. Typically, in the evaluation of individual projects, the incremental 
effects of predicted new crop production on total available markets are 
studied, and, if they are relatively small, the conclusion is drawn that  the 
additional supplies will have little or no effect on existing or projected mar- 
ket prices. No attention is given to the potential of other competing crop 
producing areas to increase their own supplies of the crop in question and to 
occupy the market niche that  the project planner has reserved for the new 
project. This is particularly true for the so-called high-value, but also high- 
risk, crops such as fruits, vegetables, cot ton,  coffee and others. The following 
analysis of eight large irrigation projects in Mexico will illustrate the problem. 
Table II shows a comparison of some of the projected characteristics of 
the above-mentioned eight projects with those of all existing irrigation dis- 
tricts of 1973--1974. As can be seen, the total irrigated area of the new proj- 
ects was projected to be equal to almost 21% of the area harvested (including 
double-cropping) of all existing districts in 1973--1974. Predicted average 
gross income per hectare (in constant  prices) was ~ 23% higher than income 
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TABLE II 
Projected characteristics of eight new compared to all existing irrigation districts, 1973/74 
crop year and projected . I  (from S.R.H., 1975 and various unpublished reports) 
New Existing New projects as 
projects districts a percent of 
existing districts 
Total area irrigated 
hectares harvested 611.100 2,972.093 20.6 
Percent of area dedicated to 
fruits and vegetables 8.3 5.2 32.6 
Percent of area dedicated to 
cotton 14.7 15.2 19.6 
Average gross income per ha, 
all crops (US $) 754.40 611.11 123.4 
Average gross income per ha, 
fruits and vegetables (US $) 2,257.30 1,728.43 130.6 
Average gross income per ha, 
cotton (US $) 806.67 928.06 86.9 
Average gross income per ha, 
all crops except fruits, 
vegetables and cotton (US $) 582.27 477.05 122.1 
Percent of total gross income 
generated by fruits and vegetables 24.8 14.8 -- 
Percent of total gross income 
generated by cotton 15.7 23.0 -- 
Total average net income per ha of 
fruits and vegetables (US $) 1,462.40 n.a. .2 -- 
Total average net income per ha of 
cotton (US $) 425.60 n.a. .2 -- 
Total average net income per ha of 
all other crops (US $) 223.20 n.a. .2 -- 
• 1 Exchange rate US $1.00 =- Mex. pesos 12.50. For the existing districts income refers to 
average during 1973--1974. For the new projects data refer to projected income at full 
maturity in constant, base-year prices. 
• 2 n.a. = not available. 
r ea l i zed  in  e x i s t i n g  d i s t r i c t s .  Th i s  p r e s u m e d  inc rease  in  n e t  i n c o m e  was the  
r e su l t  of ,  (1) h ighe r  a s s u m e d  y ie lds  pe r  h e c t a r e  for  a l m o s t  all c rops ;  a n d  (2) 
a n d  m o r e  i m p o r t a n t l y ,  t he  r e s u l t  o f  p r o j e c t e d  c r o p  c o m p o s i t i o n s  t h a t  va r ied  
s i g n i f i c a n t l y  f r o m  t h o s e  o b s e r v e d  in  e x i s t i n g  d i s t r i c t s .  Whi le  t h e  l a t t e r  
p r o d u c e d  f ru i t s  a n d  vege tab l e s  o n  o n l y  ~ 5 . 2 %  of  t he  l a nd ,  t h e  n e w  p r o j e c t s  
were  p r o j e c t e d  to  d e d i c a t e  8 .3% o f  t h e i r  a rea  to  t hese  p o t e n t i a l l y  h igh 
va lue  c rops .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  ~ 1 4 . 7 %  of  t he  l a n d  was p r e d i c t e d  to  be p l a n t e d  
with cot ton,  another high-value crop, compared to 15.2% in existing 
districts .1 . These projected cropping patterns would have resulted in an 
overall net  increase in the area of land producing fruit and vegetables by 
32.6% {compared to 1973--1974 *2 ) and producing cot ton  by 19.6%. As will 
be shown below, these projections appear to be far too  optimistic. 
Inclusion of  fruits, vegetables and cot ton in predicted cropping patterns 
seemingly is rather attractive from an economic point  of  view. Both average 
gross and net incomes rise significantly. Predicted gross income per hectare 
for fruits and vegetables was $2,257.30. This compares to an average of  
$582.27 if these higher-value crops were to be excluded. Not  surprisingly, 
then, the 8.3% of land allocated to fruits and vegetables would account  for 
24.8% of total  gross, and an even more impressive 33.4% of total net income 
(last percentage not  shown in Table II). Cotton,  with 14.7% of the area, would 
account  for another 17.5% of gross and 17.2% of net income if these predic- 
tions were realistic. The farmer who would manage to put  his land into 
fruits and vegetables seemingly would be handsomely rewarded, since his 
net income per hectare would increase from $223.30 to $1,462.40, or by 
some 655%. For cotton,  these differentials would be more modest ,  but  still 
amount  to an impressive 91% gain. 
The question to be asked is why farmers in already existing districts do 
not  seize the oppor tuni ty  for switching from low-value, low-net return crops 
to those that are apparently so much more profitable. While lack of  knowl- 
edge, distance to markets, production risks from pests, lack of  peak-load 
farm labor, and climatological or soil factors all play some role, the real 
answer to this question is that  viable, reasonably secure markets for signifi- 
cant increases in output  of  these high-value crops do not  exist. While these 
crops, potentially, have a high market  value, and while, potentially, they 
could reward the grower with high income per hectare, they also face sub- 
stantial marketing risks from highly volatile prices. This becomes quite 
apparent from an analysis of the domestic and export  markets for Mexican 
fruits, vegetables and cotton.  
Domestic markets for fruit and vegetables 
It is estimated that some 60% of Mexico's domestically marketed vege- 
table and fruit productions pass through Mexico City's wholesale market. 
The City's wholesale prices, therefore, provide a good indication of  overall 
marketing conditions. Table III shows the range of weekly price fluctuations 
*1 These  two  pe rcen t ages  are roughly the same since s o m e  of  the eight pro jec t s  were  
c l imat ica l ly  u n s u i t e d  for  c o t t o n  p r o d u c t i o n .  
*2 Rela t ive  to  i r r igat ion d is t r ic ts  on ly .  Subs t an t i ve  a m o u n t s  o f  these  c rops  are also 
g rown  in small-scale i r r igat ion un i t s  or  on  pr iva te ly  irr igated land.  The  to ta l  i r r igated 
acreage a m o u n t e d  to  ~ 5  "10 6 ha.  
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TABLE III 
Range of weekly whole-sale prices of fresh vegetables, Mexico, January--February, 1975 
(from S.A.G., 1975) 
(Mex. pesos per kg) 
high low 
Ratio low/high 
Onions 2.20 1.48 0.67 
Garlic 5.27 3.83 0.73 
Tomatoes 5.71 3.20 0.56 
Chile, green 8.10 3.57 0.44 
Beans, green 4.69 1.85 0.39 
Peas, green 5.51 2.82 0.51 
for a number  of fresh vegetable staples during a two-month period in 1975. 
As can be seen, price fluctuations are large and range from a low/high ratio 
of 39% for green beans, a relatively quickly perishable crop, to 73% for garlic, 
a commodi ty  with a long unrefrigerated storage life. On an annual basis, 
these daffy and weekly price fluctuations are even larger and exceed for 
major products their mean annual price level. What these sharp fluctuations 
indicate is that  marketing risks are high, and that,  depending on alternative 
sources of supply that  may come on the market the same day, or depending 
on fluctuations in demand, gross revenues to the producer may fall by 
50% and more. 
These drastic price changes are largely unpredictable, even on an overall 
seasonal basis. This can be seen from Fig. 1 which shows monthly  average 
Mexico City wholesale prices for red, round tomatoes (the single most 
important  vegetable crop marketed). Current prices between April and 
September, 1975 were significantly lower than those in 1974, and that  in 
spite of a general inflation rate well in excess of 20% per year. Furthermore,  
both in 1974 and 1976 monthly  price levels were highest during the same 
period, while in 1975 they were the lowest, compared to the rest of the 
year. In other words, seasonal price fluctuations worked in quite different 
directions from one year to the next in three successive years. One likely 
reason for this seasonal unpredictability is that  there are many growers, in 
many areas, and that  climatic zones in Mexico are such that  almost any crop 
can be grown somewhere at any time of the year. Many potential suppliers 
will enter or leave the market on a rather volatile basis, depending on their 
past success or failure or their future price expectations. 
But it is nevertheless true that the potential gain from fruit and vegetable 
production in periods of medium to high prices is higher than the gain from 
lower-valued crops such as grains. As a result, the markets are frequently in 
an oversupply situation. For example, regression analysis of average monthly  
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wholesale tomato prices in constant terms during the period of  1974--1976 .1 
showed that in the majority of  the 33 observed periods more tomatoes were 
sold than would have been rational from an overall profit-maximizing point 
of view, i.e. transactions took place in the inelastic range of  the estimated 
demand function. What this means is that total revenue to all sellers would 
have increased if supplies had been lower .2 . 
One of  the consequences of  such a continuous oversupply situation is 
that eventually a number of  growers will turn to less volatile, lower-valued 
crops. This seems to have been the case in Mexico in recent years. In 
absolute quantities, the supplies of short-cycle crops actually declined since 
1974. This is the result of a continuous cost squeeze, with farmgate prices 
increasing at slower rates than the rapidly increasing rate of  inflation since 
1972--1973.  Only for long-cycle crops (generally tree-fruits) did supplies 
remain steady or increased slightly. This is to be expected, since these growers 
are locked into production from long-life assets (e.g., trees) for as long as 
out-of-pocket production and harvesting costs are lower than farmgate 
prices .3 . 
• 1 The  1 9 7 4 - - 1 9 7 6  regression equat ion  t o o k  the form of:  
(price)  = US $ 4 4 9 . 2 8  - -  US $ 0 . 0 2 1 6 ( t o n )  
m o n t h l y  quant i t i e s  sold ranged from 6 , 2 0 0  to  over 1 7 , 0 0 0  tons ,  w i th  above 1 0 , 4 0 0  tons  
being transacted in the inelast ic  range o f  the d e m a n d  funct ion .  
• 2 It also means ,  however ,  that  the o f t e n  rumored t ight market  contro l  o f  M e x i c o  City's  
d o m i n a n t  who le sa l e  merchants  is less m o n o p o l i s t i c  than is general ly  assumed.  
• 3 B e t w e e n  1 9 7 2  and 1 9 7 6  the i n d e x  o f  market  prices for vegetables  increased from 1 2 0  
to  2 2 0 ,  and for shor t -cyc le  fruits  f rom 1 0 0  to  18 2  ( 1 9 7 0  = 100) .  For  long-cyc le  fruits,  
prices rose o n l y  f rom 95 to  150 .  These  divergent  price trends were  a result  o f  changing 
market  supplies .  Bo th  vegetables  and short -cyc le  fruits  dec l ined after 1 9 7 4 ,  f rom 1 5 0  to 
1 2 0  for the former  and from 1 1 0  to  90  on a c o m p o s i t e  tonnage  basis.  Long-cyc l e  fruit 
suppl ies ,  on  the  other  hand,  increased from 1 2 0  to 138  (data from S.A.G. ,  1 9 7 6 ) .  
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Export markets for fruits and vegetables 
Mexico is the dominant  winter-season import  supplier of  fresh fruits and 
vegetables to the U.S.A. and Canada. Its major compet i tor  is Florida. As can 
be seen from Table IV, the Mexican share of  total supplies ranges from 36% 
for bell peppers to 81% for fresh strawberries. Supplying fruits and vege- 
tables for exports  is very attractive since farmgate prices are far higher than 
prices obtainable in the domestic market. This is quite apparent from the 
data shown in Table V, which show farmgate prices for export  crops and the 
lowest  average farmgate prices for districts selling exclusively in the domestic 
market.  
However,  export  markets are strictly limited to the winter season. For a 
variety of cost-related reasons Mexico is not  competit ive with U.S. growers 
during the spring--summer and fall seasons. It is also unable to compete  in 
the quantitatively much larger, but  much lower-priced U.S. and Canadian 
canned and frozen vegetable and fruit markets, with the single exception of  
frozen or canned strawberries and some tropical fruits. 
Unfortunately,  these export  markets are also rather limited in quantitative 
terms. U.S. per capita fresh fruit and vegetable consumption has been stag- 
nant or declined in recent decades. Between 1960--1962 and 1973--1975 
average U.S. per capita consumption fell by 4%, while frozen and canned 
consumption increased by 38 and 24%, respectively. It is not  surprising, then, 
that  Mexico's exports,  after rapid advances in the 1960's when they estab- 
lished themselves firmly in the U.S. and Canadian off-season markets, began 
to stagnate. Overall, exports  began to fall in constant  dollar terms after 1972 
to about  2/3 of  former levels. The out look for the future is for wide year-to- 
year swings, depending on Florida's harvesting conditions which are subject 
to recurring frost damage. However,  total market  demand will expand very 
little, and it has been estimated that the total increase in acreage required to 
accommodate  the incremental U.S. market  demand over the next ten years 
T A B L E  IV 
Mexican  and  F lo r ida  m a r k e t  shares of  the  U.S. f resh win te r  vegetable  and  f rui t  ma rke t s  
1 9 7 3 - - 1 9 7 4  c rop  year  ( f r o m  S i m m o n s  et  al., 1976)  
P r o d u c t  Marke t  share 
Mexico  F lor ida  
T o m a t o e s  49 51 
S t rawber r ies  81 18 
C u c u m b e r s  46 54 
Bell Peppers  36 64 
Eggplan t  53 47 
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TABLE V 
Inter-distr ict  average farmgate  price ranges for selected crops 1973- -1974  crop year  ( f rom 
S.R.H.,  1975) 
Crop District  Hectares  Price per Rat io  
harvested* 1, ton  h igh/ low 
HAS (US $) 
Squash Valle de Fuer te ,  Sin. 612 385.00 5.8 
Al to  Rio  Lerma,  Gto.  105 66.56 
Estado de Morelos,  109 205.12 6.4 
Onions  
C. de Chapala,  Mich. 101 32.00 
Rio Mayo,  Son. 899 800.00 8.3 Green chile 
Trujil lo,  Zac. 208 96.00 
Valle de Fuer te ,  Sin. 1,002 412.48 6.6 Toma toes  
Penitas, Col. 150 64.00 
Okra Bajo Rio  Bravo 2,646 175.44 1.7 
Laguna de Tuxpan ,  Gro.  110 103.92 
Green peas Culiacan, Sin. 102 265.12 2.8 
Rio Mayo,  Son. 1,066 96.00 
Canta loupe Valle de Guaymas,  Son. 323 208.00 4.3 
R. A m u c o  y Cutzamala ,  Gro.  201 48.00 
Valle de Fuer te ,  Sin. 140 539.84 7.5 Cucumbers  
Tepalca tepec ,  Mich. 874 72.00 
* 1 Limi ted  to districts wi th  a m i n i m u m  of  100 ha harvested of  the  part icular  crop. 
Col. - Coahui la ;  Gro.  =- Guerrero;  Gto.  -- Guanjua to ;  Mich. ---- Michoacan;  Sin. = Sinaloa;  
Son. ---- Sonora ;  Zac. ---- Zacatecas.  
will be be tween 30,000 and 35 ,000ha .  Of that,  only 3000 - -4000ha  are 
required to supply the predicted demand for fresh winter vegetables. For 
Mexico, for all practical purposes, this means that  no additional acreage will 
be needed to supply whatever market  share it can obtain and hold. 
Given the potential  profitability of  these export  markets for Mexican 
growers on the one hand and the quantitatively strictly limited and highly 
inelastic market  demand on the other*l  , Mexican exporters,  through their 
government-supported trade associations .2 , maintain tight control  over 
quantities supplied to border crossing points. Rationing of supplies whenever 
needed is a way of  life to these highly sophisticated Mexican producers. 
*1 Typical ly ,  Mexican expor t  farmgate  prices amoun t  to on ly  20--25% of  the duty-paid 
value at  the  U.S.A. border .  In terms of  supermarke t  shelf  prices, this percentage is a round 
5%. Given these price relat ionships it is clear that  reduc t ions  in Mexican farmgate prices 
will have no ef fec t  on quant i t ies  sold, excep t  to the ex ten t  that  Flor ida  producers  are dis- 
placed f r o m  a given regional  market .  
,2 Fo r  a detai led discussion o f  the  opera t ion  o f  these associations see Andrew (1975).  
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Cotton 
Mexico is one of the world's leading cot ton producers. Except  for some 
rather stable 20,000--30,000 producing hectares under dry-land farming 
conditions in south Mexico, almost all cot ton is grown under irrigation in 
northern and northwestern Mexico. Production reached its peak in the late 
1950's  when more than 600,000 ha of  irrigated land in S.R.H. districts alone 
were devoted to this crop. Since then the area planted has declined substan- 
tially.. On the other  hand, yields per hectare have risen, offsetting in part the 
decline in area. Recent  years have seen sharp fluctuations in production as a 
consequence of  world market  price developments.  In 1974--1975,  for 
example, the area planted in S.R.H. districts fell to 185,000 from 450,000 ha 
in the previous year. Since then, product ion has recovered again, with 
239 ,000ha  (198,000 in districts) planted in 1976--1977 and 358,000 
(318,000 in districts) in 1977--1978.  Total 1976--1977 ou tpu t  was about  
one million bales in 76/77 and is expected to reach almost 1.5 million in 
77/78. 
What these developments show is that there is a large potential in existing 
areas for increased production.  When market conditions are favorable, out- 
put  increases rapidly, but  it declines equally rapidly when prices deteriorate,  
as they did in 1973--1974.  From an investment point  of  view, it can be con- 
cluded that no new areas, irrigated or temporal,  are needed in order to 
facilitate greater production.  
Implications for project planning 
What must be concluded from this analysis of ou tpu t  constraints is that 
inclusion of  so-called high-value and apparently high income producing crops 
in new irrigation projects is either illusory and will not  occur in reality, or if 
these crops are really going to be planted under the prodding of the respec- 
tive government planning agency, from a national point  of  view this would 
simply mean a displacement of  already existing potential production else- 
where. 
SOME POLICY CONCLUSIONS 
The findings of  this s tudy point  towards the need for revision of  a number  
of  presently applied program and project  evaluation criteria. 
(1) In countries such as Mexico, where climatic and ecological conditions 
make it possible to grow a wide variety of both high- and low-value crops on 
existing irrigated land, but  where the latter predominate,  new projects 
should generally be evaluated on the basis of  low-value crop product ion 
only. 
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(2) Where high-value, and by implication, high-net-income crops are in- 
cluded, this inclusion should be specifically justified on the basis of  unique 
factors that  make the particular project superior to already existing ones. 
(3) Expected price levels for all specialty crops should be based on observed 
price levels in the local or regional markets to be served, not  on price levels 
in the highest-value national or export  markets or on national averages. 
Moreover these price levels have to be based on observed seasonal market  
prices, given the wide swings of the latter. Prices for perishable crops that  are 
subject to wide, daffy variations should be based on the lower end of the 
scale, since the additional income from temporary,  high market  prices are 
likely to benefit  mainly the middleman, but not  the farmer. 
(4) Detailed studies should be undertaken on an ongoing basis to estimate 
from year to year the likely growth in demand for higher-value crops in both 
domestic and export  markets. The studies should relate seasonal timing to 
likely price elasticities of  demand in the various (regional) sub-markets. 
These projections could then be used to assess in a more realistic fashion the 
actual market  potential and likely profitability of these crops. 
(5) In new projects, superior farm management  capabilities are unlikely to 
be found among the project's beneficiaries. Hence, education, e.g. extension, 
demonstrat ion plots, organization, fertilizers, credit and all other  required 
inputs are an absolute necessity to bring about  the economically required 
superior yields per hectare. Many of  these inputs, particularly those involving 
technical assistance, are in chronically short supplies. Hence the opportuni ty 
costs of these inputs, as measured by their potential net  productivity else- 
where, is also high, higher presumably than their costs of  supply (i.e. their 
wage rate). Hence, it is not  only necessary in project  planning to allow for 
these input factors, but  to (a) assure their physical availability in a timely 
fashion and (b) to evaluate their true economic costs in terms of their fore- 
gone net  productivity elsewhere. 
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